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NOTES 
ENFORCING RIGHTS:  A CASE FOR 
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER 
SECTION 253 OF THE FEDERAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 
JAMES E. LIPPERT† 
INTRODUCTION  
When entering a new market, telecommunications 
companies spend millions of dollars investing in infrastructure 
and related market-entry costs.1  Sometimes these companies 
utilize city-owned rights-of-way in order to provide their 
services.2  Although section 253 of the Federal 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“FTA”) allows state or local 
governments to manage or seek compensation for the use of 
rights-of-way, they may not do so in a discriminatory or 
unreasonable manner.3  Yet the power of the federal government 
to enforce these terms is in doubt.4  Also, section 253 does not 
explicitly grant telecommunications companies a right to sue in 
federal court.5  Therefore, after investing millions of dollars, 
telecommunications providers can be essentially held hostage by 
state and local governments.  Such “hold-ups” will cause fewer 
companies to invest in telecommunications services, which in 
turn, means higher prices and lower quality services for the 
 
† Research Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Binghamton University. 
1 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 76, Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. 
Improvement Comm’n of Boston, 184 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1222). 
2 See, e.g., Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1262 (10th Cir. 2004).  
3 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2006). 
4 See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1190–
91 (11th Cir. 2001). 
5 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(d). 
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millions of people who rely on their services.6  Thus, it is 
essential for the functioning of our society that 
telecommunications providers have a right to sue in federal 
court. 
Section 253 of the FTA prohibits any state or local 
government from interfering with a telecommunications 
provider’s ability to provide service, unless the state’s regulation 
falls within one of the two safe harbor provisions.7  The first safe 
harbor provision allows state and local governments to “regulate 
telecommunications in the public interest, as long as such 
regulations are competitively neutral.”8  The second safe harbor 
provision allows state and local “regulations relating to right-of-
way management and compensation which are competitively 
neutral and nondiscriminatory.”9  The FTA explicitly grants the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) enforcement 
power over most of section 253.10  Yet the FCC is not explicitly 
granted authority to enforce the second safe harbor provision.11  
As a result, the burden of enforcement rests with the 
telecommunications providers.  Thus, in order to enforce these 
laws, telecommunications providers must have a private right of 
action. 
Two private rights of action are available to 
telecommunications providers seeking to enforce section 253: 
(1) an implied cause of action or (2) a section 1983 claim.12  The 
result of a successful claim based on either theory is the same: 
the court creates a private right of action even though the statute 
did not expressly authorize a private suit.13  There are, however, 
differences between the two claims.  For example, section 1983 is 
 
6 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Preamble, 110 Stat. 
56, 56 (stating that increased competition and decreased regulation will result in 
lower prices and higher quality services). 
7 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a)–(c). 
8 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929, 939 n.6 
(10th Cir. 2000). 
9 Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1272 (10th Cir. 2004). 
10 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(d). 
11 See id. § 253(c)–(d). 
12 See Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the 
Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 872 n.64 
(1996). 
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Stabile, supra note 12, at 861. 
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statutorily based,14 while an implied cause of action derives from 
the common law.15  More importantly, however, the standard of 
proof traditionally required under a section 1983 claim “is far 
less stringent than what is required to establish an implied 
[cause] of action.”16   
Yet the recent case of Gonzaga University v. Doe17 has led 
some courts to believe that a private right of action is not 
available under any provision of section 253.18  In part, this view 
stems from the mistaken belief that there are no longer 
significant differences between an implied cause of action and a 
section 1983 claim.19  Moreover, some argue that the Gonzaga 
decision has created an entirely new, and more stringent, 
standard for private rights of action.20  Relying on such 
arguments, some courts have mistakenly denied 
telecommunications providers a private right of action under 
section 253.21  This approach, however, misinterprets Gonzaga.  
Part I of this Note provides background on the meaning of section 
253 and the current law regarding private rights of action.  It 
also briefly discusses the unique problems presented for private 
rights of action where the underlying legislation is passed 
pursuant to the Spending Clause—which was at issue in 
Gonzaga.  Part II discusses whether the circuit courts allow 
telecommunications providers a private right of action under 
section 253.  Some pre-Gonzaga courts granted a private right of 
action for telecommunications providers when a state or local 
government exceeded its safe harbor to manage a public right-of-
way under section 253(c).  These courts held that, under the 
traditional standard for implied causes of action, the text and 
structure of section 253 and its legislative history, in addition to 
 
14 See Sasha Samberg-Champion, How To Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a 
Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1841–42 (2003). 
15 See Stabile, supra note 12, at 864. 
16 Furtick v. Medford Hous. Auth., 963 F. Supp. 64, 71 n.18 (D. Mass. 1997). 
17 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
18 See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
19 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Limiting Suits To Enforce Federal Laws, 39 SUP. CT. 
REV. 70, 71 (2003). 
20 See id. 
21 See, e.g., Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1266–67 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
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the purpose of the FTA as a whole and other analogous sections 
of the FTA, indicates the availability of an implied cause of 
action.  For all that, many post-Gonzaga courts have denied a 
private right of action under any subsection of section 253.  These 
courts held that the Gonzaga decision was controlling and, in 
light of that decision, the telecommunications providers’ claims 
must fail.  Part III argues that telecommunications providers 
should have a private right of action where a state or local 
government exceeds its safe harbor under section 253(c), which 
allows for the management of a public right-of-way.22  First, it 
argues that the Gonzaga decision only controls where the 
underlying statute was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause.  
Since the FTA was passed pursuant to the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, the Gonzaga decision is not controlling.  Next, Part III 
argues that, properly limited, the Gonzaga decision allows a 
private right of action under section 253 for telecommunication 
providers.  In doing so, this Part concludes that a 
telecommunications provider has an implied cause of action 
under section 253(c).  Moreover, since the telecommunications 
provider succeeds on the more difficult implied cause of action 
claim, then courts should also allow the telecommunications 
providers to prevail on the easier claim to prove—a section 1983 
claim.  Finally, this Part concludes that there are significant 
policy reasons favoring a private right of action under section 
253(c) of the FTA. 
I. NEITHER THE LAW REGARDING PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION 
NOR SECTION 253 IS SETTLED  
The history of section 1983 and implied causes of action is 
both independent and intertwined,23 which has created confusion 
 
22 For example, one way a state or local government may exceed its safe-harbor 
is when a state or local government charges discriminatory or unreasonable rates 
against a telecommunications provider under the guise of managing a public right-
of-way. See, e.g., TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). 
23 Compare Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–85 (2002) (arguing that 
implied causes of action and section 1983 claims involve the same initial inquiry), 
and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (judging an implied cause of action claim by 
looking to whether the statute was passed to protect the plaintiff by creating a 
remedy for a violation of the statutory right that is consistent with the statute and 
whether there was an obligation on the state), with Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 
329, 329–30 (1997) (judging a section 1983 claim by asking whether the plaintiff was 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 657 (2010) 
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in the courts.  Similarly, the courts criticized section 253 as the 
product of poor legislative drafting.24  As a result, there is 
confusion and disagreement among both federal circuit and 
district courts as to the meaning of section 253.25  Since private 
rights of action and section 253 claims are difficult to understand 
on their own, there is immense confusion when they interact.26  
A. Confused Courts and Section 253 of the Federal 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 
In passing the FTA as a whole, Congress sought to advance 
two objectives.27  First, Congress wanted to “end the monopolies 
in local telephone services . . . by fostering competition between 
telephone companies.”28  Second, Congress hoped “to benefit 
consumers by fostering competition between telephone 
companies in cities throughout the United States.”29  Therefore, 
Congress thought that by decreasing regulation, the resulting 
competition would spur innovation and reduce the cost, as well as 
 
an intended recipient of a right, and whether there was an obligation on the state), 
and Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1870–73 (arguing that section 1983 and 
implied causes of action are, and always have been, judged differently by the courts).  
24 Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d 480, 488 
(M.D.N.C. 2006) (“To be sure, the structure of section 253 is confusing, and courts 
have struggled with its interpretation.”); Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 
202 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“[I]t is worth noting that § 253 is not a 
model of clarity. Courts that have sought to interpret the section have noted the 
questions raised by its wording and structure.”). 
25 See City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 488. 
26 Compare, e.g., TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624 (holding that a private right of 
action lies under section 253), with City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1266–67 (holding 
that a section 1983 claim does not lie under section 253). 
27 Cf. John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 
U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (1992) (stating that, when employing statutory 
interpretation, it is important to “[r]ead the entire statute”). 
28 AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 585 
(N.D. Tex. 1998); see Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 
Preamble, 110 Stat. 56, 56. Prior to the FTA, telecommunications services were 
provided by state-sponsored monopolies with legislative bars to market entry. See 
AT&T, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 586. Thus, the purpose of the act was to allow new 
telecommunications carriers entry into the market. See id.; see also City of 
Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (“Thus, in passing the FTA, Congress intended 
that market competition, rather than state or local regulations, would primarily 
determine which companies would provide the telecommunications services 
demanded by consumers.”).  
29 AT&T, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 585.  
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 657 (2010) 
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increase the quality, of telecommunications services.30   
 
 
The courts have formed two distinct interpretations of 
section 253 of the FTA: (1) the “deliberate omission” 
interpretation; and (2) the “overriding purpose” interpretation.31  
The courts that follow the “deliberate omission” interpretation 
believe that Congress intended to allow for a private right of 
action under 253(c)—the safe harbor which gives the state the 
 
30 Telecommunications Act of 1996 Preamble. 
31 Section 253 entitled “Removal of Barriers to Entry” provides in part the 
following: 
(a) In general 
No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal 
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of 
any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications 
service. 
(b) State regulatory authority 
Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a 
competitively neutral basis and consistent with section 254 of this title, 
requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect 
the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of 
telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers. 
(c) State and local government authority 
Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local government 
to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable 
compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competitively 
neutral and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of public rights-of-way on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, for use of public rights-of-way on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation required is publicly disclosed 
by such government. 
(d) Preemption 
If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the Commission 
determines that a State or local government has permitted or imposed any 
statute, regulation, or legal requirement that violates subsection (a) or (b) 
of this section, the Commission shall preempt the enforcement of such 
statute, regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct 
such violation or inconsistency. 
47 U.S.C. § 253(a)–(d) (2006). The reason the courts have interpreted the section 
differently is due in part to the fact that section 253 is not a “model of clarity.” Qwest 
Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2001). In 
fact, this confusion caused the FCC to offer its own interpretation of section 253. See 
generally FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FCC NO. 98-295, SUGGESTED 
GUIDELINES FOR PETITIONS FOR RULING UNDER SECTION 253 OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT (1998), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_ 
Carrier/Public_Notices/1998 (scroll down and click on fcc98295.wp or fcc98295.txt) 
[hereinafter FCC NOTICE]. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 657 (2010) 
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power to manage public rights-of-way.32  They base their 
understanding of the statute in subsection (d), which is the 
“enforcement provision” of the statute.33  That provision explicitly 
gives the FCC enforcement power over the general prohibition in 
subsection (a) and the safe harbor for regulation in the public 
interest found in subsection (b).34  Yet subsection (c) was not 
included in the text of subsection (d); thus, the FCC does not 
have enforcement power when a state exceeds its safe harbor to 
manage public rights-of-way.35  Therefore, a private right of 
action is necessary to enforce subsection (c).36   
Although “deliberate omission” theorists ultimately base 
their conclusion in subsection (d), they start with the general 
prohibition found in subsection (a).37  Subsection (a) is a general 
proscription against interference with telecommunication 
services by state or local governments.38  To this end, the 
“deliberate omission” followers believe that subsection (a) 
provides substantive limits “on the authority of state and local 
governments to regulate telecommunications.”39  That is, 
subsection (a) functions as a limitation on the power of any state 
to pass any law that interferes with telecommunication services.   
Yet the other subsections of section 253 provide safe harbors 
from the general prohibition found in subsection (a),40 as these 
subsections “are couched not in terms of limitation, but of 
exception to the general rule set forth in (a).”41  For instance, 
subsection (b) allows state and local governments to “regulate 
telecommunications in the public interest, as long as such 
regulations are competitively neutral.”42  Furthermore, 
 
32 See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 
1187–88 (11th Cir. 2001). 
33 See id. at 1189. 
34 47 U.S.C. § 253(d); see BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189. 
35 47 U.S.C. § 253(d); see BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189. 
36 See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1191. 
37 See id. at 1186; see also Stevens, supra note 27, at 1374 (“[W]hen federal 
judges are required to interpret acts of Congress, they must begin by reading the 
text of the statute.”). 
38 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). 
39 BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1186. 
40 See id. at 1186–87. 
41 See id. at 1187. 
42 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929, 939 n.6 
(10th Cir. 2000). For example, a state will violate subsection (a) if it charges a 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 657 (2010) 
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subsection (c) allows state and local “regulations relating to 
right-of-way management and compensation which are 
competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory.”43  Thus, these two 
subsections operate as exceptions to the general prohibition 
found in subsection (a).   
Finally, “deliberate subscribers” reach subsection (d).  This 
subsection is the “enforcement provision” of section 253, and 
provides that if “a State or local government has permitted or 
imposed any statute, regulation, or legal requirement that 
violates subsection (a) or (b) . . . the Commission shall preempt 
the enforcement of such statute, regulation or legal 
requirement . . . to correct such violation or inconsistency.”44  In 
light of this language, “deliberate omission” subscribers conclude 
that the FCC has enforcement authority over subsections (a) and 
(b).45  As such, the FCC can enforce the general requirement that 
a state not interfere with telecommunications, and determine if 
the state action is within the safe harbor for nondiscriminatory 
regulation in the public’s interest.  For all that, any reference to 
subsection (c) is notably absent from this provision.46  Therefore, 
these courts conclude that this is a deliberate omission, and that 
the FCC does not have enforcement power over “regulations 
relating to right-of-way management and compensation which 
are competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory.”47  As a result, 
the only way to enforce the limits of this safe harbor is through a 
private right of action.   
The “deliberate omission” theorists also find support for their 
interpretation in other sections of the FTA.48  Specifically, these 
courts look to section 255, which explicitly prohibits a private 
 
telecommunication provider money to lay wires inside its state. Subsection (c), 
however, provides the state with an affirmative defense. That is, although 
subsection (a) is violated by this conduct, a state can argue that subsection (c) allows 
for such fees. Likewise, if a state requires that the company only lay wire that meet 
certain safety specifications, that would violate subsection (a). Yet the state could 
assert an affirmative defense that this conduct is allowed under subsection (b). Thus 
subsection (a) provides substantive limits, and subsection (b) and (c) provide 
affirmative defenses to a violation of subsection (a). 
43 Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1272 (10th Cir. 2004). 
44 47 U.S.C. § 253(d) (2006). 
45 See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189–91. 
46 See id. at 1191. 
47 City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1272. 
48 See Stevens, supra note 27, at 1376 (“ ‘Read the entire statute.’ ”). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 657 (2010) 
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right of action.49  Since the FTA explicitly grants a private right 
of action in some sections of the FTA, sound statutory analysis 
dictates that silence in other sections should be interpreted as an 
implicit grant of a private right of action in that subsection.50  
Since there is no explicit prohibitory language in section 253, a 
private right of action is implied.   
The second approach to section 253 is the “overriding 
purpose” view.51  As in any sound statutory interpretation, 
“overriding purpose” theorists start at the beginning of the 
section.52  They first decide whether a state action “falls within 
the proscription of section 253(a).”53  That is, whether the  
state or local government has illegally interfered with 
telecommunications services.54  Next, the “overriding purpose” 
subscribers argue that certain state actions are allowed under 
subsections (b) and (c), even though they are prohibited by 
subsection (a).55  For example, although managing a public right-
of-way is prohibited under subsection (a), it is explicitly allowed 
under subsection (c).56  Thus, “overriding purpose” subscribers, 
much like “deliberate omission” subscribers, recognize a safe 
harbor provision within the statute.57  Still, the two schools of 
thought differ with regard to subsection (d).  “Deliberate 
omission” theorists argue that if Congress wanted to grant the 
FCC enforcement power over subsection (c), that subsection 
would have been listed within subsection (d).58  “Overriding 
 
49 47 U.S.C. § 255(f) (2006) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
authorize any private right of action to enforce any requirement of this section or 
any regulation thereunder. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with 
respect to any complaint under this section.”). 
50 See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). 
51 See Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d 480, 489–90 
(M.D.N.C. 2006). 
52 See Stevens, supra note 27, at 1374 (stating that it is important to “ ‘read the 
statute’ ”). 
53 See City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (quoting FCC NOTICE, supra 
note 31).  
54 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2006). 
55 See FCC NOTICE, supra note 31. 
56 Compare 47 U.S.C. § 253(a), with 47 U.S.C. § 253(c). 
57 Compare, e.g., City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (finding a “ ‘safe 
harbor’ ”), with BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 
1187 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding a “ ‘safe harbor[ ]’ ”). 
58 See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1265–66 (10th Cir. 2004); 
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 252 F.3d at 1189, 1191. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 657 (2010) 
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purpose” advocates, however, argue that the FCC must have 
enforcement power over all subsections of 253 in order to fulfill 
the FTA’s overriding purpose, which is to “regulate interstate 
and foreign commerce and provide safe and efficient services, to  
 
be executed and enforced by the FCC.”59  Therefore, Congress 
must have intended for the FCC to have enforcement power over 
subsection (c), even though it is not explicitly conferred.60  
Moreover, these “overriding purpose” subscribers believe 
that the FTA is always explicit when it grants a private right of 
action.  For example, sections 252,61 258,62 and 27463 of the FTA 
all explicitly provide for a private right of action to enforce their 
mandates.64  This is important because the FTA’s explicitness in 
 
59 City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)). 
Such subscribers find further support for their theory in another section of the FTA. 
Specifically, section 257(a), which provides: 
Within 15 months after February 8, 1996, the Commission shall complete a 
proceeding for the purpose of identifying and eliminating, by regulations 
pursuant to its authority under this chapter (other than this section), 
market entry barriers for entrepreneurs and other small businesses in the 
provision and ownership of telecommunications services and information 
services, or in the provision of parts or services to providers of 
telecommunications services and information services. 
47 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2006). 
60 City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 490. Although such an interpretation 
seems to rebut sound statutory analysis, see Stevens, supra note 27, at 1374, some 
courts have held that this is not the case where the plain meaning of a statute “will 
produce a result ‘demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.’ ” Clark v. 
Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006). 
61 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2006). 
62 Id. § 258. 
63 Id. § 274. 
64 See Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm’n of Boston, 184 
F.3d 88, 107–08 (1st Cir. 1999) (Noonan, J., concurring). Section 252(e)(6), for 
example, governs agreements between telecommunications carriers and the states, 
and a state’s ability to accept or reject such agreements. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6). 
There, the FTA specifically provides that: “In a case in which a State . . . makes a 
determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may 
bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court . . . .” Id. Likewise, Congress 
was explicit in creating a private right of action in section 258(b). See Cablevision, 
184 F.3d at 107. If a carrier violated the procedures of the FCC under section 258, 
the statute specifically provides that the carrier is not shielded from “any other 
remedies available at law.” 47 U.S.C. § 258(b). In other words, the aggrieved party 
may sue under other theories of law—for example, fraud or misrepresentation. Cf. 
Valdes v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121–22, 123–25 (D. Conn. 
2001) (finding that the plaintiffs could pursue a private right of action claim under 
section 258 for slamming, which is similar to, but not preemptive of, common law 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 657 (2010) 
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granting a private right of action in other sections of the FTA 
indicates that silence in section 253 should be interpreted as 
denying a private right of action.65  Therefore, these courts 
believe that section 253 does not allow for a private right of 
action. 
B. A Confusing Clarification of Implied Causes of Action 
In recent years, the Supreme Court, despite its attempt to 
clarify the law,66 has created great confusion with regards to 
private rights of action.  Traditionally, the courts looked to Cort 
v. Ash67 and its progeny to judge the existence of an implied 
cause of action.68  The Cort decision analyzed four factors to 
determine if an implied cause of action existed69: (1) “[I]s the 
plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute 
was enacted[?]’ ”70  (2) “[I]s there any indication of legislative 
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to 
deny one?”71  (3) “[I]s it consistent with the underlying purposes 
 
fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation). Similarly, section 274(e) is also explicit 
when creating a private right of action. See Cablevision, 184 F.3d at 107 (Noonan, J., 
concurring). That section, essentially limiting the ability of carriers to engage in 
electronic publishing, specifically provides that “[a]ny person” can bring a private 
right of action under the FTA. 47 U.S.C. §§ 207, 274(e). Conversely, however, some 
sections of the FTA are explicit when a private right of action should not be granted. 
See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). 
65 See City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 490. 
66 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002). It is worth noting, 
however, that during the early years of the country, the courts were very 
sympathetic to a plaintiff’s injury. See Stabile, supra note 12, at 864. That is, the 
theory was that “an individual is entitled to an adequate remedy for any legal wrong
 .” Id. This was true “whether [it was a] common law wrong or statutory wrong.” 
Id. For these early American courts, it did not matter whether Congress had 
intended a remedy. Id. 
67 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
68 See, e.g., TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623; see also, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Suing 
Under § 1983: The Future After Gonzaga University v. Doe, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1417, 
1424 (2003); Stabile, supra note 12, at 866–67. 
69 See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 12, at 867. 
70 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 
(1916) (asking, in other words, “does the statute create a federal right in favor of the 
plaintiff?”)). 
71 Id. Unlike the first factor, however, whose origin can be traced back to 1916, 
this second prong appeared to be relatively new factor. Compare Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 
241 U.S. at 33 (decided in 1916), with Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of 
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). In fact, as early as 1803, congressional 
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of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
plaintiff?”72  (4) “[I]s the cause of action one traditionally 
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the 
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action 
based solely on federal law?”73  Notably, in Cort, only two of the 
four factors focused on legislative intent,74 and those two factors 
were not outcome determinative.75  Therefore, the Cort factors 
were neither designed, nor originally interpreted, to be applied 
rigidly.76  Rather, they were designed to be flexible.77  As such, 
courts were free to balance a deficiency with one factor against 
the oversatisfaction of another.78  But soon thereafter, the factors 
were applied more rigidly by the Court, focusing mainly on 
legislative intent—factors (1) and (2).79  This was done because 
the courts thought the flexible standard permitted too many 
private rights of action.80  Some members of the Court felt that 
this lax standard caused an explosion of litigation in the federal 
courts.81  Thus, these justices thought that more rigid standards 
would reduce the number of federal suits.82  Despite these 
alterations, Cort was still the controlling decision for an implied 
cause of action, only with greater emphasis given to 
congressional intent.83 
Then the Supreme Court attempted to clarify implied cause 
of action jurisprudence in Gonzaga University v. Doe.84  In that 
case, the Court had to determine if a statute, enacted pursuant to 
the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, conferred a remedy 
 
intent was of little or no value to courts in deciding private rights of action. See 
Stabile, supra note 12, at 864. 
72 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
73 Id. 
74 See Stabile, supra note 12, at 867–68. 
75 See id. at 868. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 868 & n.41 (noting that originally, the factors were applied flexibly). 
79 See id. at 868; see also BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 
F.3d 1169, 1189 (11th Cir. 2001); TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 
623–24 (6th Cir. 2000).   
80 Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1867. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623–24. 
84 536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002) (finding that the Court’s decisions have not been 
“models of clarity”). 
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available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.85  At first, the Court recognized 
that a section 1983 claim and an implied cause of action claim 
involve different inquires.86  According to the Court, however, 
both claims begin with the same inquiry: “whether Congress 
intended to create a federal right.”87  To make such a finding, 
there must be “clear and unambiguous . . . rights-creating 
language.”88  Moreover, this “rights-creating language” must 
“confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries.”89  But 
after an intention to create a federal right is demonstrated, the 
Court recognized that the necessary inquiries for the two private 
rights of action diverge.90  After a section 1983 plaintiff 
establishes congressional intent to create a federal right, the 
plaintiff is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the right is 
enforceable.91  Conversely, an implied cause of action plaintiff has 
the burden of showing that “the statute manifests an intent ‘to 
create not just a private right but also a private remedy.’ ”92  
Although the Court never explicitly overruled Cort in its opinion, 
there is no doubt that Gonzaga overruled Cort where the 
underlying legislation was passed pursuant to the Spending 
 
85 Id. at 276. Although Gonzaga involved a section 1983 claim, discussed infra, 
the Court felt the need to address implied causes of action too. Id. at 283 (rejecting 
“the notion that our implied right of action cases are separate and distinct from our 
§ 1983 cases”). 
86 See id. at 283. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 290. 
89 See id. at 285. 
90 Id. at 284–85. 
91 See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
92 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 
(2001)). Admittedly, this concept is difficult to understand, but it again focuses on 
congressional intent. See Sital Kalantry, The Intent-to-Benefit: Individually 
Enforceable Rights Under International Treaties, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 63, 70 (2008). 
That is, although there is congressional intent to create an individual right, there is 
no intent to give the plaintiff the power to enforce that right. See id. Normally, in 
these instances, enforcement power is given to a regulatory agency. See, e.g., Wright 
v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 426 (1987). Yet where there 
is no agency or the agency cannot effectively enforce the act, the Court will find that 
Congress must have intended to create a private remedy. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 
280 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 426). But a plaintiff who brings a section 1983 claim 
does not need to go this extra step because “§ 1983 generally supplies a remedy for 
the vindication of rights secured by federal statutes.” Id. at 284.  
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Clause.93  Because of the Court’s focus on the Spending Clause, 
however, it is unclear if the decision is controlling where the 
underlying legislation was not passed pursuant to the Spending 
 
Clause.  Yet it makes sense to limit the Gonzaga decision to cases 
involving the Spending Clause because of the unique problems 
presented by Spending Clause legislation.   
C. A Confusing Clarification of Section 1983 Claims 
Section 1983 and implied causes of action have similar 
histories.94  As a result, the standard for determining a section 
1983 claim was similar to the pre-Gonzaga Cort factors.95  Still, 
the consensus among the courts was that if a plaintiff could show 
an implied cause of action, then the plaintiff could show a section 
1983 claim, as the section 1983 standard was less stringent.96  
Traditionally, there were three principle factors in determining if 
a section 1983 remedy was available under a statutory 
provision97: (1) whether “Congress . . . intended that the provision 
in question benefit the plaintiff,”98 (2) whether “the plaintiff[’s] 
[asserted interests are] not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its 
enforcement would strain judicial competence,”99 and (3) whether 
the statute “impose[s] a binding obligation on the States.”100  This 
three-factor analysis, however, did not end the inquiry—it only 
established a right and a “rebuttable presumption that [it was] 
 
93 See infra Parts I.C and III. Yet some scholars, judges, and members of the 
Court argue that Cort had already been overruled. See Samberg-Champion, supra 
note 14, at 1870–71 (citing Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Franklin v. 
Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992), as affirmative evidence that the 
Court had already overruled Cort. But see TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 
618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[A] majority of the Court has not gone so far as to hold that 
Cort v. Ash has been ‘effectively overruled.’ ” (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 484 
U.S. 174, 188 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring))). 
94 See supra note 23. 
95 See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
96 Furtick v. Medford Hous. Auth., 963 F. Supp. 64, 71 n.18 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff may enforce a statute against 
state and local officials via section 1983 . . . is far less stringent than what is 
required to establish an implied private right of action.”). 
97 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 340–41. 
100 Id. at 341. 
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enforceable under § 1983.”101  This presumption was rebutted, for 
example, if Congress explicitly or impliedly foreclosed a section 
1983 remedy.102  That is, Congress could explicitly allow for a 
private right of action, or, in the absence of an explicit statement, 
it could be so clear from the text of the statute that a private 
right of action is necessary to enforce the provision.  Therefore, 
despite this subtle difference, the law regarding section 1983 
claims was similar to implied causes of action.   
 
But the Gonzaga Court changed this standard—at least with 
regards to statutes passed under the Spending Clause.103  Thus, 
the new standard for section 1983 claims is similar to the test for 
implied causes of action.104  First, the court must find evidence of 
“an unambiguously conferred right,”105 directed “upon a class of 
beneficiaries.”106  The plaintiff, however, is still presumed to have 
a remedy after the right is established;107 this presumption is still 
rebutted “by showing that Congress ‘specifically foreclosed a 
remedy under [section] 1983.’ ”108  For example, if there is a 
comprehensive enforcement scheme in the statute, this is 
evidence of an implied foreclosure of a private remedy.  Thus, the 
Gonzaga decision altered the standard by which section 1983 
claims are measured, much like the Court altered the implied 
cause of action standard.  Nevertheless, because of the Court’s 
obvious concerns with Spending Clause legislation, it is unclear 
whether this reasoning extends to cases where the underlying 
legislation is not passed pursuant to the Spending Clause. 
D. The Contractual Analogy of the Spending Clause 
The Court is skeptical about inferring a private right of 
action where the legislation was passed pursuant to the 
Spending Clause because it would force the states to abide by 
conditions that they did not consider when accepting the federal 
 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
106 Id. at 285. 
107 See id. at 284. 
108 See id. at 284 n.4 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9 (1984)).  
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funds.109  That is, unlike most federal legislation, the states are 
under no obligation to comply with legislation passed pursuant to 
Congress’s power to spend.110  Therefore, the federal government 
attempts to entice compliance by offering them federal funds.111  
In exchange for the federal funds, however, the state must agree 
to implement or comply with the federal legislation.112  
Accordingly, the Court analogized Spending Clause legislation to 
a contract between the states and the federal government.113  As 
such, the Court attempts to remain consistent with contractual 
theory.114  For example, when interpreting the legislation 
between the state and the federal government, the Court always 
tries to preserve the reasonable expectations of the parties.115  As 
such, the Court has held that if Congress attaches conditions to 
the conferral of money, “it must do so in clear and unambiguous 
terms.”116  Therefore, when a court reads a private right of action 
into Spending Clause legislation, it is adding terms to the 
contract, thereby altering the reasonable expectations of the 
parties.117   
In keeping with the contractual analogy, the claimants in a 
private right of action are considered third-party beneficiaries 
under a contract.118  Third-party beneficiaries are parties that are 
related to a contract, but not one of the parties to the contract.119  
Thus, not all third-party beneficiaries have an enforceable right 
under the contract.120  Rather, the third-party beneficiary must 
 
109 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
110 See Fermeen Fazal, Is Actual Notice an Actual Remedy? A Critique of Gebser 
v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1077 (1999) 
(stating that Spending Clause legislation is voluntary). 
111 See West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 286 
(4th Cir. 2002). 
112 See id. 
113 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
114 See id. 
115 Stabile, supra note 12, at 908. 
116 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002). 
117 Cf. Stabile, supra note 12, at 908 (stating that courts should consider the 
reasonable expectations of the parties when deciding whether to grant an implied 
cause of action). 
118 See Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1852. 
119 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS 880–81 (7th ed. 2008). 
120 See id. at 881. 
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demonstrate a legally protected interest in the contract to have 
an enforceable right.121 
A private right of action claimant is not a party to the 
contract between the state and federal government.  Instead, the 
claimant enjoys a relationship similar to that of a third-party 
beneficiary.  Thus, if the claimant wants to affect the terms of the 
contract between the state and the federal government by 
inferring a private right of action, the court has to determine 
whether that third-party beneficiary should have a legally 
protected interest in the contract.122  Consequently, one 
interpretation of Gonzaga is that it determines whether a 
plaintiff seeking a private right of action has a legally protected 
interest in the contract between the state and federal 
government.123  Yet such an interpretation would limit the reach 
of the Gonzaga decision to private rights of action involving the  
Spending Clause, as outside of that context there is no need for 
contractual analogy, or to determine if a plaintiff is a third-party 
beneficiary. 
II. WHETHER A PLAINTIFF CAN BRING AN IMPLIED CAUSE OF 
ACTION OR A SECTION 1983 CLAIM UNDER SECTION 253 OF THE 
FTA HAS CAUSED A SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS 
There is uncertainty regarding the correct interpretation of 
section 253 and the proper standard by which to judge a private 
right of action under that section.124  Cases dealing with this 
uncertainty can be divided into two categories: those cases which 
were decided before Gonzaga and those cases decided after 
Gonzaga.  Those cases decided pre-Gonzaga were argued on an 
implied cause of action theory and held that section 253(c) 
allowed for an implied cause of action.125  On the other hand, 
those cases decided post-Gonzaga were argued on a section 1983 
theory,126 and they held that there was no section 1983 claim 
 
121 See id. at 881–82. 
122 See Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1852. 
123 See infra Part III.A.2. 
124 See supra Part I.A. 
125 See infra Part II.A.  
126 Since these post-Gonzaga cases followed the Court’s decision in Gonzaga, it 
would not matter if these cases were argued on a section 1983 or an implied cause of 
action basis because none of the courts found the creation of a federal right and, 
thus, did not reach the part where the claims diverge. See infra Part II.B. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 657 (2010) 
674 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:657   
 
under section 253 of the FTA.127  Yet the fact that the pre-
Gonzaga cases were presented as implied causes of action and 
those after Gonzaga as a section 1983 claim is pure 
happenstance.128   
A. Pre-Gonzaga—Section 253(c) of the FTA Confers an Implied 
Cause of Action. 
These pre-Gonzaga courts held that there was an implied 
cause of action under section 253(c) of the FTA when a state or 
local government exceeded its safe harbor to manage or seek 
compensation for the use of a public right-of-way.129  They 
reached this conclusion by looking to the purpose behind the FTA 
as a whole, the text and structure of section 253, that section’s 
legislative history, and, by analogy, to other relevant sections of 
the FTA.130  Thereafter, they held that those sources indicated 
that the telecommunications providers were “ ‘one of the class for 
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,’ ”131 and that 
there was evidence of legislative intent to create a private 
remedy.132  Thus, the telecommunications providers satisfied the 
first two factors of the Cort analysis.  Moreover, these courts held 
that the telecommunications providers satisfied the remaining 
two Cort factors.133  That is, an implied cause of action was 
consistent with the underlying legislative scheme, and the cause 
of action was not one traditionally relegated to the states.134 
First, these courts held that the text and structure of section 
253 indicated an implied cause of action under section 253(c).135  
They noted that although subsection (d) grants the FCC 
enforcement over subsections (a) and (b), it does not explicitly do 
 
127 See infra Part II.B. 
128 After all, prior to Gonzaga, it was clear that the section 1983 factors were 
less stringent. See Furtick v. Medford Hous. Auth., 963 F. Supp. 64, 71 n.18 (D. 
Mass. 1997). 
129 See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1189 
(11th Cir. 2001); TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). 
130 See, e.g., TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623–24. 
131 BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189 n.12 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66, 78 (1975)). 
132 See, e.g., TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624. 
133 See, e.g., id. at 623. 
134 See, e.g., id. at 624. 
135 See, e.g., id. 
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so for subsection (c).136  Therefore, these courts held that the FCC 
does not have enforcement power over subsection (c) when a state 
exceeded its safe harbor to manage a public right-of-way.137  
Thus, there must be an implied cause of action under section 
253(c) because, if there is not, then no one could enforce the 
limits of that safe harbor.138  Therefore, there is both textual and 
structural support for an implied cause of action under section 
253(c). 
Second, the courts found further support for an implied 
cause of action after consulting other parts of the FTA.139  They 
noted that section 255 expressly foreclosed any private right of 
action under that section.140  These courts concluded that when 
Congress wanted to foreclose an implied cause of action under 
the FTA, they did so explicitly.141  Since Congress did not 
expressly exclude a private right of action under section 253, this 
silence demonstrated congressional intent to allow for implied 
causes of action where a state or local government exceeded its 
safe harbor to regulate public rights-of-way.142   
Nevertheless, these courts acknowledged that other parts of 
the FTA are explicit when they allow for private rights of 
action.143  Specifically, they noted that sections 252, 258, and 274 
all explicitly allow for a private right of action.144  These courts 
held that these provisions allow for remedies “over and above 
[the] procedures or remedies available from the [FCC]”145 and do 
not apply to ordinary private rights of action.146  Therefore, the 
FTA only explicitly grants implied causes of action when it 
provides remedies in addition to enforcement by the FCC.  Since 
 
136 See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623. 
137 See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623. 
138 See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1191; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624. 
139 See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624; see also Stevens, supra note 27 (“ ‘Read the 
entire statute.’ ”). 
140 See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 Id. 
146 See id. 
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the FCC does not have enforcement power over subsection (c),147 
sections 252, 258, and 274 are of no guidance.148 
  Third, these courts found further evidence for an implied 
cause of action by consulting legislative history.149  Specifically, 
they looked to Senator Slade Gorton’s statements during the 
Senate debate on subsection (d).150  First, Senator Gorton noted 
that, even if his amendment was not passed, the FCC did not 
have enforcement power under subsection (c).151  He stated, 
however, that his amendment would stand for the proposition 
“that any challenge [under subsection (c)] take place in the 
Federal district court in that locality and that the Federal 
Communications Commission not be able to preempt such 
actions.”152  Thus, by explicitly noting that any challenge must 
take place in federal court and that the FCC does not have 
jurisdiction, the intended remedy must be a private right of 
action.153  If not, then there would be no way to enforce the 
confines of the safe harbor.   
Thus, these courts held that the telecommunications 
providers had satisfied the Cort factors and granted them an 
implied cause of action under section 253(c).154  On the most 
important factors, those focusing on legislative intent, these 
courts concluded that the telecommunications providers had 
shown they were one in a class of protected beneficiaries, and 
that Congress sought to create a remedy for them under 
subsection (c) of the FTA.155  Moreover, they went on to hold that 
the telecommunications providers satisfied the remaining two 
 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
149 See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1189–
91 (11th Cir. 2001); TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623. 
150 See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1190–91; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 
623. 
151 See 141 CONG. REC. S8213 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Gorton) (“There is no preemption . . . for subsection (c).”); TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 
623. 
152 See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 977 F. Supp. 836, 840 (E.D. Mich. 1997) 
(quoting 141 CONG. REC. S8213 (statement of Sen. Gorton)). 
153 See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1191; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624.  
154 See, e.g., TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623. 
155 See id. at 623–24. 
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Cort factors.156  Therefore, these courts allowed for an implied 
cause of action under section 253(c). 
B. Post-Gonzaga—Section 1983 Is Not Enforceable Under 
Section 253 of the FTA 
After determining that the Gonzaga decision controls, these 
courts held that a section 1983 claim cannot be commenced under 
section 253 of the FTA.157  In reaching this conclusion, these 
courts first asked “ ‘whether Congress intended to create a federal 
right.’ ”158  The answer to that turned on “ ‘whether or not 
Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of 
beneficiaries.’ ”159  And that was “answered in the negative where 
a statute ‘grants no private rights to any identifiable class.’ ”160 
 
These courts held that the focus of section 253’s language 
was on prohibiting state and local activities, not on granting 
rights to telecommunications providers.161  That is, the language 
of subsection (a) is couched entirely in terms of a prohibition on 
state conduct.162  Moreover, although the safe harbors do, in some 
manner, grant benefits, these benefits are directed at the state 
and local governments.163  There are, however, no benefits 
directed at the telecommunications providers.164  Therefore, 
Congress did not intend to create a federal right and to confer 
such right on telecommunications companies. 
Furthermore, these courts rejected the notion that the 
absence of subsection (c) in the language of subsection (d) is 
 
156 See, e.g., id. at 623. 
157 See Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 260–61 (5th Cir. 2008); 
NextG Networks of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 513 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir. 2004). 
158 Sw. Bell Tel., 529 F.3d at 260 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 
283 (2002)). 
159 NextG Networks of N.Y., 513 F.3d at 52 (quoting Gonzaga, 535 U.S. at 285). 
160 City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284). But 
even if there was a private right, and, thus, a presumption that there was a remedy, 
this presumption is overcome by the presence of a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme. 
161 See Sw. Bell Tel., 529 F.3d at 261; NextG Networks of N.Y., 513 F.3d at 53; 
City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1265. 
162 See 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2006). 
163 See id. § 253 (b)–(c). 
164 Sw. Bell Tel., 529 F.3d at 262. 
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indicative of legislative intent to provide for a section 1983 
claim.165  This was rejected,166 in part, because it would defeat the 
overriding purpose of the FTA, which is to “regulate interstate 
and foreign commerce and provide safe and efficient services, to 
be executed and enforced by the FCC.”167  Moreover, these courts 
held that granting a private right of action based on this absence 
was the product of a misunderstanding of the legislative history 
behind section 253.168  These courts argued that Senator Gorton’s 
statements should not be interpreted to allow for section 1983 
claims.169  Rather, his statements concerned where the federal 
government may bring a preemption challenge against a state for 
a violation of section 253.170  As such, the Senator’s statements in 
no way reflect intent to allow for a private right of action.171  This 
is evidenced by his use of the word “preemption” and not “private  
 
 
right of action.”172  Therefore, these courts held that the FCC 
must have exclusive control over violations of subsection (c), even 
though it is not explicitly mentioned in the text of section 253.173 
Moreover, at least one court rejected the notion that the FTA 
is always explicit when it wants to prevent a section 1983 
claim.174  While this court noted that section 255 explicitly denies 
a private right of action, it further noted that section 274 
explicitly creates a private right of action.175  Therefore, the court 
argued, it is improper to conclude that silence in subsection (c) 
 
165 See id.; City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1265–66. 
166 See, e.g., id. at 262. 
167 Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d 480, 490 
(M.D.N.C. 2006) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)). 
168 See id.; City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1266. 
169 See, e.g., City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1266. 
170 See, e.g., id. 
171 See, e.g., id. 
172 See, e.g., id. 
173 See, e.g., id. As such, these courts held that even if the telecommunications 
companies were given a private right, Congress rebutted the presumption of a 
private remedy. For example, if the FCC has authority over subsection (c), then it 
has authority over the entirety of section 253. If this is the case, then there is a 
comprehensive enforcement scheme. As such, the presumption of a private remedy is 
negated because Congress has impliedly foreclosed a private remedy by creating a 
statutory remedy. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
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allows for a section 1983 claim because when the FTA creates a 
private right of action, it does so explicitly.176  Based on this 
evidence, these courts held that Congress did not intend to confer 
a right on telecommunications companies under section 253 of 
the FTA.177  Therefore, since Congress did not intend to confer a 
right on telecommunications companies, they could not sustain a 
section 1983 claim under any part of section 253.  
III. WHEN FACED WITH A SECTION 1983 OR AN IMPLIED CAUSE OF 
ACTION CLAIM UNDER SECTION 253 OF THE FTA, COURTS SHOULD 
NOT CONSIDER GONZAGA CONTROLLING PRECEDENT 
The pre-Gonzaga courts correctly applied the Cort factors, 
and concluded that there was an implied cause of action under 
section 253(c) of the FTA for three reasons.178  First, it was 
erroneous for the post-Gonzaga courts to hold that Gonzaga was 
controlling because that case should be limited to legislation 
passed pursuant to Congress’s power to spend under Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution.  Since the 
FTA was passed pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause,179 
Gonzaga is not controlling.180  Second, since the pre-Gonzaga 
courts correctly concluded that there was an implied cause of 
action, which is the more stringent standard, then those courts 
should also permit a section 1983 claim under section 253(c) of 
the FTA.  Third, private rights of action are justified under 
section 253(c) because they advance significant policy goals.  For 
these reasons, the courts should allow for an implied cause of 
action and a section 1983 claim where a state or local 
government exceeds its safe harbor to manage a public right-of-
way under section 253(c) of the FTA.  
A. The Gonzaga Decision Should Be Limited to Spending 
Clause Cases 
The Court has a long history of skepticism when dealing 
with private right of action claims brought under Spending 
 
176 See id. at 1266–67. 
177 See, e.g., id. 
178 See supra Part II.A. 
179 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
180 See infra Part III.B. 
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Clause legislation because of its contractual nature and the 
availability of other remedies.181  For example, the Court 
attempts to preserve the reasonable expectations of the state and 
federal government.182  Thus, a claimant that brings a private 
right of action under Spending Clause legislation shares the 
same attenuated status as a third-party beneficiary.183  On 
another note, the typical remedy under Spending Clause 
legislation for state noncompliance is for the federal government 
to withhold funds, not enforcement via a private right of action.184  
For these reasons, it is common for courts to spurn private rights 
of actions under Spending Clause legislation.   
1. Spending Clause Legislation Is Unique Because of Its 
Contractual Nature 
The Court is often reluctant to grant a private right of action 
under Spending Clause legislation because it would alter the 
reasonable expectations of the state and federal government.  
The arrangement between the state and federal government in 
Spending Clause legislation is like that of two private parties 
engaged in a private contract.185  There is clearly consideration 
because both parties are subject to a benefit and a legal 
detriment.186  For example, the state receives federal funding, but 
in return, must abide by the terms of the legislation.187  Likewise, 
the federal government receives a benefit and suffers a legal 
detriment.188  That is, the states will advance the federal 
government’s policy—the benefit—in exchange for federal 
money—the legal detriment.189  Moreover, there is also at least 
 
181 See Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1855–56. In fact, many of the 
precedents the Court relied on in Gonzaga are primarily cases in which the 
underlying legislation was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause. See id.; see also 
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279–82 (2002) (citing, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)). 
182 See infra Part III.A.1. 
183 See infra Part III.A.2. 
184 See infra Part III.A.3. 
185 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
186 See Blum v. Gen. Elec. Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 720, 728 (W.D. Tex. 2008) 
(“Consideration consists of benefits and detriments to the contracting parties.”). 
187 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
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the semblance of a bargain.190  Therefore, even though it appears 
that Spending Clause legislation is little more than a contract of 
adhesion, with the federal government offering a “take-it-or-
leave-it” proposition,191 some states do “leave” certain federal 
funding.192  But when the states do “take” the money, the Court 
wants to make sure the states are informed of the conditions.193  
Thus, if Congress wants to allow for private rights of action in 
legislation passed pursuant to its spending power, it must do so 
explicitly.194  If courts later allow a plaintiff to bring a private 
right of action claim under such legislation, then the court has 
effectively “alter[ed] the terms of [the] contract[ ] between [the] 
state[ ] and the federal government.”195  Such a result, however, 
would be inconsistent with contract theory because it would not 
mirror the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time of 
the bargain.196   
2. Private Right of Action Claimants in Spending Clause 
Legislation Are Akin to Third-Party Beneficiaries 
The Court in Gonzaga limited private rights of action under 
Spending Clause legislation by treating claimants as third-party 
 
190 See id. 
191 Compare id. (finding that Spending Clause legislation is in the nature of a 
contract), and United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936) (holding that it is an 
unconstitutional exercise under the Spending Clause if the legislation is tantamount 
to coercion by the federal government), and Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 
1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the legislation passed pursuant to the Spending 
Clause was not coercive because it presented a “take-it-or-leave-it” opportunity to 
the states), with IAN AYERS & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 575 
(7th ed. 2008) (“Standard form contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis are 
often referred to as ‘contracts of adhesion.’ ”). But see Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, 
Chevron, and the Spending Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 1239 n.197 (2001) (doubting 
that Spending Clause legislation is invalid as a contract of adhesion). 
192 See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, New York Just Says No to Abstinence Funding, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at B3. 
193 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002). This is very similar to 
what courts consider when determining if a contract is unconscionable. See Williams 
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that 
one relevant question in determining whether a contract is unconscionable is 
whether the party had “a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the 
contract, or were the important terms hidden.”). 
194 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280. 
195 Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1875. 
196 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 
Yale University rev. ed. 1993). 
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beneficiaries.  That is, if the state is akin to a promissor and the 
federal government is akin to the promisee, then it stands to 
reason that a claimant bringing a private right of action claim 
pursuant to Spending Clause legislation is, at best, a third-party 
beneficiary.197  Under contract theory, however, not all third-
party beneficiaries enjoy enforceable rights under a contract.198  
Rather, a third-party beneficiary must have a legally protected 
interest in the contractual relationship in order to have a claim 
under the contract.199  Thus, the Court in Gonzaga treats 
claimants in a private right of action as third-party beneficiaries: 
that is, not automatically bestowed enforceable rights.  As such, 
not every claimant will have a legally protected interest in the 
“contract” between the state and the federal government.  
Therefore, the Court is only willing to create a private right of 
action when “Congress intended to confer individual rights upon 
a class of beneficiaries.”200  Thus, the Gonzaga decision was an 
attempt to reign in the rights of third-party beneficiaries to 
Spending Clause legislation: that is, claimants seeking to enforce 
Spending Clause legislation via a private right of action.  For all 
that, this contractual analogy is unique to Spending Clause  
 
legislation.  Therefore, if the underlying legislation is not passed 
pursuant to the Spending Clause, the standard developed in 
Gonzaga for third-party beneficiaries should not be applied.   
 
 3.  Termination of Funds Is the Preferred Enforcement 
Mechanism 
Another reason to limit the Gonzaga decision is due to an 
inherent and preferred enforcement mechanism in all Spending 
Clause legislation.  The Court held in Gonzaga that there must 
be evidence of both an intention to create a private right and a 
 
197 See Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1852–53. 
198 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 119. 
199 See id. 
200 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (emphasis added). Although 
under the implied cause of action theory, the courts have always weighed heavily on 
the presence of or absence of legislative intent, see supra notes 87–93 and 
accompanying text, the Gonzaga court wanted the same treatment for third-party 
beneficiaries proceeding under section 1983. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280. 
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private remedy.201  But as the Court notes, “ ‘[i]n legislation 
enacted pursuant to [Congress’s] spending power, the typical 
remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed 
conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but 
rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to 
the State.’ ”202  Thus, in all Spending Clause legislation, there is 
arguably evidence that Congress has “ ‘specifically foreclosed a 
remedy.’ ”203  If the underlying remedy in Spending Clause 
legislation is for the federal government to withhold funding, it 
follows that there is no private remedy.  Thus, it is easy to 
understand why the Court has only twice in twenty-seven years 
found a section 1983 action where the underlying legislation was 
passed pursuant to Congress’s power to spend.204  But legislation 
that is not passed pursuant to the Spending Clause will not 
always have a comprehensive enforcement scheme.  As such, it 
does not make sense to expand the Gonzaga decision outside of 
Spending Clause legislation.  
B. The FTA Was Not Passed Pursuant to the Spending Clause 
Since the FTA was passed pursuant to Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce, and not pursuant to the Spending 
Clause, the Gonzaga decision should not apply to section 253 of 
the FTA.205  Many of the concerns involving private rights of 
action under Spending Clause legislation are simply not present 
where the underlying legislation is passed pursuant to 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.  For example, 
there is no contractual relationship between the state and the 
 
201 Id. at 284–85. For example, with regards to implied causes of action, the 
plaintiff must show that Congress intended to create a private remedy. See 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). Likewise, although the plaintiff in 
a section 1983 claim is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that a private remedy is 
created, the presumption is rebutted if the state can show that Congress foreclosed 
that remedial avenue. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1004 & n.9 (1984). 
202 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981)). 
203 Id. at 284 n.4 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1004 n.9). 
204 Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1875. 
205 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to regulate 
commerce among the states); 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2006) (prohibiting states from 
interfering with interstate telecommunications providers). 
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federal government.206  Rather, states do not have the 
opportunity to opt-out of legislation passed pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.207  As such, there is no bargain or legal 
detriment to the federal government.  If there is no bargain or 
legal determinant, then there is an absence of a relationship akin 
to a contract.208  Therefore, the courts are not concerned with 
altering the reasonable expectations of the parties.  Moreover, 
since there is no contractual relationship, a private right of 
action claimant is not akin to a third party.  Thus, contractual 
analogy does not prevent these claimants from seeking 
enforcement.   
Additionally, unlike Spending Clause legislation, there is no 
inherent enforcement scheme in Commerce Clause legislation.209  
It is true that the FCC does act as an enforcement mechanism in 
the FTA, and, thus, Congress must have considered at least a 
partial enforcement mechanism.210  Yet, unlike withholding funds 
in Spending Clause legislation, the FCC is not an overriding 
enforcement mechanism.211  This is why the circuit courts had to 
engage in in-depth statutory analysis to determine the reach of 
the FCC under subsection (d).212  At least some of the courts held 
that the FCC did not even enforce all of section 253.213  Therefore, 
an overriding enforcement mechanism is absent from the FTA.  
Thus, the post-Gonzaga courts should not have applied the 
Gonzaga standard.  Instead, they should have followed the lead 
of the pre-Gonzaga courts and applied the Cort factors.   
 
206 See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 
U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (holding that when Congress has legislated in interstate 
commerce, that legislation dominates). 
207 See id. at 351–52. 
208 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) 
(noting that in Spending Clause legislation, there is a relationship akin to a 
contract). 
209 Compare Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1004–05 (1984) (noting that in 
Spending Clause litigation, the typical remedy is to withhold the money), with, e.g., 
Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 409 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that the appropriate 
remedy under this Commerce Clause legislation was an injunction of the offending 
statute). 
210 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(d). 
211 See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that section 253(c) is not subject to enforcement by the FCC but, rather, by 
an implied cause of action). 
212 See, e.g., id. at 623. 
213 See id. at 624. 
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C. The Cort Factors Mandate a Private Right of Action  
Since Gonzaga is not controlling, the correct approach is to 
apply the Cort factors to see if there is an implied cause of action 
under section 253 of the FTA.  The Cort factors may be 
summarized as follows: (1) “[I]s the plaintiff ‘one of the class for 
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted[?]’ ”214  (2) “[I]s 
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, 
either to create such a remedy or to deny one?”215  (3) “[I]s it 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme 
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?”216  (4) “[I]s the cause of 
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area 
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be 
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal 
law?”217  Still, emphasis should be placed on factors one and 
two—those factors pertaining to legislative intent.218 
Under the first Cort factor, it is clear that the FTA was 
passed to benefit telecommunications providers.  As stated in the 
preamble to the FTA, the goal of Congress was to reduce 
regulation and increase competition.219  This benefited 
telecommunications providers in two ways: existing providers 
were no longer burdened by stringent regulations220 and potential 
telecommunications providers were no longer excluded from the 
market.221   
Moreover, section 253 of the FTA itself demonstrates that 
Congress intended to benefit telecommunications providers.  For 
example, subsection (a) provides that “any entity” is to be free 
from attempts by state or local governments to interrupt or 
interfere with their services.222  Further, although subsection (c) 
 
214 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 
241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
219 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Preamble, 110 
Stat. 56, 56. 
220 See id. (stating that one goal was deregulation). 
221 See id. (stating that one goal was to increase competition). 
222 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2006); see also Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 36, 
Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-2258, 02-
2269). 
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creates a safe harbor for state and local governments,223 it still 
operates within a right of the telecommunications provider.224  
That is, even though section 253(c) is a safe harbor for 
governmental activity, once the government operates outside 
that safe harbor, it is interfering with the rights granted to 
telecommunications providers.  Therefore, even within the safe 
harbor of subsection (c), Congress still intended to protect the 
telecommunications providers.225 
Under the second Cort factor, it is clear that Congress 
intended to create a private remedy under section 253(c).  Section 
253(c) supports an implied cause of action because subsection (c) 
is notably absent from the “enforcement provision” of section 
253.226  This indicates that Congress did not want the FCC to 
have enforcement power over subsection (c).227  It does not make 
sense to argue that the FCC does not have enforcement power 
and that telecommunications providers have no private right of 
action.  Although one can assume that certain statutes are to be 
under-enforced,228 such a reading would result in almost no 
enforcement when a state or local government exceeded its safe 
harbor under subsection (c).229  For example, a state or local 
government could simply flaunt the law and say that their 
activity was within subsection (c)—the management of a right-of-
way.  But if the FCC does not have jurisdiction and there is no 
private right of action, then no one could determine whether they 
exceeded the scope of the safe harbor.  Therefore, since Congress 
 
223 See Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2008). 
224 See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1187 
(11th Cir. 2001) (stating that subsection (a) confers the substantive right and (b) and 
(c) act as safe-harbors). 
225 See Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm’n, 38 F. Supp. 2d 
46, 56 (D. Mass. 1999). 
226 47 U.S.C. § 253(d). 
227 See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). 
228 See Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1859–62. 
229 It appears that the only possible enforcement would be implied cause of 
action cases by consumers. 47 U.S.C. § 207 (2006). But this seems to be the very 
attenuated type of suits that concerned the Court in Gonzaga. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 
536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1878–81. Therefore, 
it is likely that a post-Gonzaga court would reject this claim, even though the FTA is 
not passed pursuant to the Spending Clause. A suit by telecommunications 
providers, however, would not be attenuated and, thus would not raise such 
concerns. 
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specifically foreclosed FCC enforcement, there must be an 
implied cause of action for telecommunications providers. 
Furthermore, since the FTA is always explicit when it 
prohibits an implied cause of action, silence in section 253 should 
be understood as approval of such claims.230  For example, the 
language of section 255 clearly prohibits a private right of 
action.231  There is, however, no prohibitive language in section 
253.232  Although certain other provisions of the FTA are explicit 
when they allow for implied causes of action, this only occurs 
when Congress wants to allow for suits “over and above” the 
FCC.233  For instance, section 258 allows for a private right of 
action if a telecommunication provider is dissatisfied with an 
FCC ruling regarding that section.234  Since there is no FCC 
enforcement of subsection (c), these other sections are 
unpersuasive. 
Likewise, the legislative history indicates that Congress 
intended to create a private remedy under section 253(c) for 
telecommunications providers.235  For example, Senator Gorton 
noted that subsection (c) was noticeably absent from subsection 
(d); thus, the FCC could not enforce subsection (c).236  Moreover, 
the Senator contemplated that suits would take place outside of 
the FCC, and that such cases should be held in district courts.237  
Although it is plausible that the Senator was simply referring to  
preemption claims,238 this alone, even under the strictest 
interpretation of the Cort factors, is not enough to overcome the 
overwhelming evidence in favor of an implied cause of action.239 
The third Cort factor is satisfied because a private right of 
action is consistent with the underlying legislative purposes of 
the FTA.  The preamble states that the FTA was passed “[t]o 
 
230 See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624. 
231 See 47 U.S.C. § 255 (2006). 
232 See id. 
233 See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624. 
234 See 47 U.S.C. § 258 (2006). 
235 See Stevens, supra note 27, at 1381 (“[C]onsult the legislative history.”). 
236 See 141 CONG. REC. S8213 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Gorton). 
237 See id. 
238 See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004). 
239 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (stating that the Cort 
factors are used only to judge legislative intent). 
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promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure 
lower prices and higher quality services for . . . consumers.”240  In 
other words, the purpose of the legislation was to promote 
competition in the telecommunications market in the hopes of 
ultimately providing higher quality service to consumers at a 
lower cost.241  There is no reason why an implied cause of action 
would be inconsistent with this end.  Although at times Congress 
did intend for enforcement to be done solely by the FCC, at 
others it was content to allow for enforcement by other means.242  
For example, Congress deliberately excluded from the language 
of subsection (d) any mention that the FCC should have 
enforcement power over subsection (c).  If Congress wanted the 
FCC to have sole jurisdiction, it would have included subsection 
(c) within the language of (d).243  Such a reading is supported by 
Senator Gorton’s statements in which he notes that subsection (c) 
is being deliberately omitted from subsection (d).244  Moreover, 
the FTA is always explicit when it wants to prohibit an implied 
cause of action.245  Therefore, when Congress thought that an 
implied cause of action was inconsistent with the FTA, such suits 
were prohibited.  Yet Congress does not explicitly prohibit an 
implied cause of action in section 253.246  Thus, the legislative 
history and the text and structure of section 253 demonstrate 
that an implied cause of action would not hamper the underlying 
purpose of the FTA. 
The fourth Cort factor is satisfied because the cause of action 
is not “one traditionally relegated to state law.”247  The FTA was 
passed pursuant to Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce.248  Interstate commerce is not an area traditionally 
regulated by the states.249  Rather, the whole point of the 
 
240 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Preamble, 110 Stat. 
56, 56. 
241 See id.  
242 See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). 
243 See id. at 624. 
244 See 141 CONG. REC. S8213 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Gorton). 
245 See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624. 
246 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2006). 
247 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
248 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
249 See generally, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197–200 (1824). 
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Commerce Clause was to prevent the states from interfering with 
goods shipped in interstate commerce.250  Thus, section 253 
explicitly prohibits states from disrupting the “ability of any 
entity to provide . . . telecommunications service”251 unless such 
state activity falls within one of the safe harbors.252  Therefore, 
the activities governed by section 253 are clearly not those 
activities normally left to the state, and, thus, the fourth Cort 
factor is undoubtedly satisfied. 
Accordingly, the Cort factors allow for a private action under 
section 253(c) of the FTA.  The text and structure of section 253, 
along with the FTA as a whole and section 253’s legislative 
history all lend credence to this claim.  They indicate that section 
253 is not generally regulated by the states and that an implied 
cause of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the 
FTA.  More importantly, however, they indicate that Congress 
intended to create an implied cause of action for the 
telecommunications carriers.   
Since an implied cause of action claim would succeed under 
section 253(c) of the FTA, it stands to reason that a section 1983 
claim would also succeed.  This result follows because the Cort 
factors are considered to be more stringent than the factors 
governing section 1983 claims.253  Therefore, any court that 
allows an implied cause of action will also allow for a section 
1983 claim. 
D. Policy Reasons Support a Private Right of Action 
Although subsections (a) and (b) of section 253 of the FTA 
are enforced by the FCC, this agency does not have enforcement 
 
250 See Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, Village of Islands, 475 F. Supp. 
2d 1281, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“ ‘[I]n order to succeed, the new Union would have to 
avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations 
among . . . the States under the Articles of Confederation.’ ” (quoting Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979))). Moreover, under the dormant commerce 
clause, the Court has held that states cannot regulate interstate commerce, even if 
Congress has yet to legislate in that area. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s 
Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560, 567 (4th Cir. 2005). 
251 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). 
252 See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1187 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
253 Furtick v. Medford Hous. Auth., 963 F. Supp. 64, 71 n.18 (D. Mass. 1997). 
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power over subsection (c).254  If the FCC does not enforce the 
limits of the safe harbor for state and local governments to 
manage a public right-of-way, and there is no private right of 
action, then a state or local government can abuse this safe 
harbor provision.  For example, even though subsection (a) 
prohibits a state or local government from interfering with 
telecommunication services, a state or local government could 
manage a public right-of-way in discriminatory way.  Although 
this is prohibited under subsection (c),255 the FCC would not have 
enforcement power over that subsection.256  Moreover, even 
though such action would violate subsection (a) because it 
interfered with telecommunications services,257 a state or local 
government could escape liability by claiming they were acting 
within the confines of subsection (c).  Since the FCC does not 
have enforcement authority under subsection (c), the FCC would 
be powerless to prohibit this activity.258  Allowing a state or local 
government to circumvent the law in this way would hamper 
Congress’s goal of “end[ing] the monopolies in local telephone 
services and . . . benefit[ing] consumers by fostering competition 
between telephone companies in cities throughout the United 
States.”259  Therefore, a private right of action is needed under 
subsection (c) to insure that the overriding purpose of the FTA is 
implemented.  After all, “[l]aws have little meaning unless they 
can be enforced.”260 
Another reason to allow private rights of action under 
section 253 is to protect the reasonable expectations of the 
 
254 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(d). 
255 See id. § 253(c). 
256 See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189–91 (holding that “enforcement of 
(c) is left to private parties”). 
257 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). 
258 See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). 
259 AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 585 
(N.D. Tex. 1998).  
260 Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 71; see also Response & Reply Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 31, Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 543 F.3d 
571 (9th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 05-56076 (L), 05-56435) (stating that without a private 
right of action the local government had, for four years, “steadfastly refuse[d] to 
abide by [s]ection 253’s proscriptions”). 
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parties.261  Undoubtedly, telecommunications companies make 
huge investments when they install equipment to provide 
telecommunications services.262  Although telecommunications 
providers expect to pay reasonable compensation for the use of 
public right-of-ways, they do not expect state or local 
governments to charge discriminatory or unreasonable fees in 
violation of federal law.263  Moreover, if they did charge 
discriminatory fees, a telecommunications provider would expect 
a legal remedy.264  Furthermore, it is unreasonable for state or 
local governments to expect that they could openly flaunt federal 
law.265  Therefore, since the FCC does not have enforcement 
power over subsection (c), a private right of action protects the 
reasonable expectations of the telecommunications providers and 
state and local governments by enforcing the limits of the safe 
harbor in subsection (c). 
Finally, a private right of action for telecommunications 
companies under section 253 does not present “a special risk of 
vexatious litigation”266 that would “swell[ ] our already 
overburdened federal court system beyond capacity.”267  The 
primary purpose of a corporation is to maximize profits.268  
Litigation, however, is costly and inefficient.269  Therefore, 
corporations often settle lawsuits even if they will prevail at 
 
261 See Stabile, supra note 12, at 908 (stating that one policy reason for not 
enforcing an implied cause of action is where it will disrupt the reasonable 
expectations of the parties). 
262 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 34, Cablevision of Boston v. Pub. 
Improvement Comm’n, 184 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1222) (stating that the 
telecommunications provider had invested millions in infrastructure in order to 
provide services). 
263 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2006). 
264 See generally, e.g., TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 
2000). 
265 And “if the law supposes that . . . the law is a ass—a idiot.” CHARLES 
DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 394 (Everyman Library ed., 1940).  
266 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86 
(2006). 
267 See Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1985). 
268 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). 
269 See Alexandra Anne Hui, Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Compulsion of 
Arbitration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 711, 717 (2007). 
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trial.270  Thus, it is extremely unlikely that corporations will 
commence a private right of action under section 253 merely to 
annoy state or local governments.  Instead, a corporation is likely 
to screen out the less-than-meritorious claims and only bring suit 
when there is substantial evidence that section 253 was violated.  
Therefore, most private rights of action brought under section 
253 by a telecommunications provider will be worthy of a court’s 
time and consideration. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Telecommunications providers must have access to the 
courts under section 253 because only then will Congress’s goal 
be achieved—deregulation which leads to lower costs and higher 
quality to consumers.  To apply the Gonzaga decision to this area 
of the law would effectively eliminate Congress’s purpose in 
passing section 253 of the FTA.  Thus, courts should allow for a 
private right of action under section 253 for three reasons.  First, 
the Gonzaga decision should be limited only to Spending Clause 
legislation.  Such a result is justified by the availability of other 
remedies and the unique relationship between all parties to 
Spending Clause legislation.  Second, if the Gonzaga decision is 
not applied, the Cort factors should be applied, and the Cort 
factors mandate an implied cause of action under section 253(c) 
of the FTA.  Since the Cort factors mandate an implied cause of 
action, the less stringent section 1983 claim must also be 
allowed.  Third, several important policy reasons dictate that 
there should be a private right of action under section 253(c) of 
the FTA.  Therefore, the pre-Gonzaga courts correctly applied the 
law by allowing a private right of action. 
 
 
270 Cf. CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 367–68 (5th ed. 2006) (stating that directors will 
only bring litigation when it is in the corporations best interest). 
